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AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 
MANAGERIAL CORPORATE 
CAPITALISM, AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN 
INCOME TAX 
AJAY K. MEHROTRA* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
1909 was a critical turning point in the development of American tax law 
and policy. In that year, Congress enacted a national corporate tax at the same 
time that it introduced a constitutional amendment permitting a federal 
personal-income tax.1 The corporate tax, which was framed as a “special excise 
tax” on the privilege of doing business, had an immediate, albeit modest, impact 
on federal revenues, accounting for nearly $21 million of the $289 million of 
total internal revenue for fiscal year 1910.2 The constitutional amendment, by 
contrast, languished in the halls of state legislatures for several years before it 
was finally ratified in 1913. Once it was adopted, the Sixteenth Amendment 
nullified the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1895 invalidation of the nation’s first 
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this article was presented at the Midwest Law and Economics Association’s annual conference. I would 
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 1. Corporation Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909); S.J. Res. 40, 61st Cong. 
(1909). President William Howard Taft proposed the corporate tax and the constitutional amendment 
in June 1909. S. DOC. NO. 61-98 (1909). 
 2. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF 
THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1910, at 26, 31, 
453 (1911). 
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peacetime national income tax3 and paved the way for the subsequent 
development of the modern American income tax. 
Although the corporate tax and the constitutional amendment were 
presented together in 1909, the amendment garnered much greater attention 
among contemporary commentators and modern scholars. And for good 
reason. Ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment had far-reaching 
consequences for American law and political economy. It not only overturned 
the most serious legal obstacle to the adoption of graduated individual-income 
taxes, it also emboldened social groups and political reformers to demand the 
first permanent federal income tax, which was enacted within a year of the 
amendment’s ratification.4 
Yet the corporate tax may have played an equally important, though more 
subtle, role in American political and economic development. Together with 
the personal-income tax, the corporate levy helped generate substantial 
government revenue throughout the twentieth century—revenue that has been 
critical to the growth of the public sector.5 Despite the uncertain incidence of 
the corporate tax, some scholars and commentators have also depicted it as an 
effective regulatory tool used to curb the abuses and increasing power of Big 
Business.6 As a result of these dual functions of raising revenue and regulating 
economic power, many historically minded scholars have tended to subsume the 
corporate levy as part of the Progressive Era’s overall tax reforms. The 
Sixteenth Amendment, the personal-income tax, and the corporate tax are thus 
all frequently viewed as part and parcel of one grand narrative in which the 
social and political demands for greater tax equity are the key determinants of 
the dramatic, early-twentieth-century transformation in American tax law and 
policy.7 
A singular focus, however, on social and political factors, especially one that 
subordinates the corporate tax to a minor role, provides only a partial account 
of the history of the modern American income tax. This article offers a broader 
 
 3. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586, modified on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 
(1895). 
 4. Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913). For more on the ratification 
process and why the corporate tax and the constitutional amendment were packaged together as part of 
a political compromise, see JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 55–59 
(1986). 
 5. Like the personal-income tax, the corporate tax initially raised a relatively small amount of 
revenue, until the mid-1940s, when corporate-tax revenues peaked and accounted for nearly 7% of 
gross domestic product (GDP). Since the 1950s, however, corporate-tax revenues have diminished 
steadily, hovering in the low single digits as a percentage of GDP. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, 
TAXING OURSELVES 22–23 (2007); Alan J. Auerbach, Corporate Taxation in the United States, 2:1983 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 451, 453 (1983). 
 6. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193 (2004); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the 
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990). For a contrasting view of the origins of the 
corporate tax, see generally Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate 
Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2001). 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 17–29. 
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explanation by moving beyond the social and political determinants to ask, 
What were the economic forces that facilitated the adoption of the modern 
graduated income tax? How did these economic factors shape the institutional 
framework that gave rise to direct and graduated taxes? And what role, if any, 
did the early corporate tax play in the creation and elaboration of the modern 
U.S. income tax? 
This article investigates two particular economic factors. First, it explores 
the broad, long-term, structural transformations in the American economy that 
fostered the development of the modern progressive income tax. Between the 
end of Reconstruction and the onset of the Great Depression, the American 
economy underwent dramatic changes. Mass migration, rapid urbanization and 
industrialization, and tremendous economic growth transformed what was by 
most accounts a peripheral New World republic into a geopolitical and 
economic power.8 These structural changes had important ramifications for 
American public finance. As the pace of urban–industrial capitalism 
accelerated, an increasing amount of output and income moved through the 
market, mainly because of the actions of large-scale industrial corporations. The 
expansion of the market as an institution, and the concomitant growth in cash 
transactions, were thus critical to the evolution of the modern income tax. 
Because the market’s cash nexus permitted more and more individuals to derive 
a greater portion of their income and wealth from the sale of their labor 
services or the deployment of their physical and financial capital, lawmakers 
were able to more easily measure and tap the growing tax base. Consequently, 
the national tax structure began to shift away from a reliance on indirect levies, 
namely import duties and excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco, toward more-
direct and graduated taxes on income and wealth transfers. 
The second set of economic factors that facilitated the development of the 
modern income tax followed from the first. The structural transformations in 
the American economy prompted more-specific changes in economic 
organizations and administrative procedures that gave government authorities 
new “tax handles” with which to assess and collect personal and business 
income.9 As income and economic power became concentrated in larger 
organizational units, namely integrated, multi-unit business corporations, it 
became easier to identify and access sources of tax revenue.10 Moreover, these 
 
 8. See generally MICHAEL H. HUNT, THE AMERICAN ASCENDANCY: HOW THE UNITED STATES 
GAINED AND WIELDED GLOBAL DOMINANCE (2007). 
 9. The term “tax handles” is generally associated with the work of early developmental 
economists. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, FISCAL SYSTEMS 125 (1969); Harley H. Hinrichs, 
Determinants of Government Revenue Shares Among Less-Developed Countries, 75 ECON. J. 546, 546 
(1965). One of the aims of this article is to apply the findings of the literature on development and tax 
structure to the American historical context. 
 10. Though scholars have identified large business corporations as crucial intermediaries in the tax-
collection process, they have generally viewed their contribution as coming during the second half of 
the twentieth century. See, e.g., W. Elliot Brownlee, Taxation in the U.S. During World War I: 
Alternatives and Legacies, in TAXATION, STATE, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED 
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new, colossal organizations implemented more-rational and routinized systems 
of accounting to accurately calculate their profits and investment returns. 
Rational calculation is, after all, one of the institutional hallmarks of modern 
capitalism.11 Although such advanced and systematic computations were 
frequently undertaken to measure internal production and distribution 
efficiencies and to attract additional finance capital, these innovations in 
gathering and processing information also helped tax authorities by reducing 
the costs of tax collection. As U.S. Treasury officials experimented with early 
forms of tax withholding, the accounting and recordkeeping of large businesses 
proved invaluable. Over time, the enactment of steeply progressive tax laws 
that tapped rising business profits and personal incomes reinforced the need for 
more-accurate recordkeeping and led to even more-standardized tax-
accounting systems. 
There was perhaps no greater marker and enabler of these economic trends 
than the rise of the large-scale, hierarchically managed, industrial corporation, 
or what business historians have referred to as the advent of American 
managerial capitalism.12 The modern business corporation, complete with 
distinct organizational units run by salaried executives, was both a product of 
the broader, turn-of-the-century structural changes in the U.S. economy, and an 
embodiment of the new types of economic organizations and administrative 
processes. Accordingly, the early national attempt to tax corporations was 
important for American economic and political development not only because 
of its revenue-raising or regulatory potential, but also because it was 
representative of the dramatic changes in the U.S. economy and of the 
organizational units contained within it. In this sense, the historical significance 
of corporate taxation rests as much with what it stood for as with what it did. 
And what it stood for was the notion that the ongoing process of American 
economic growth was providing national policymakers with new opportunities 
to transform the U.S. tax system. 
Current public-finance scholars have certainly recognized the central role of 
business corporations in the tax-collection process. As one leading scholar of 
taxation and development has written, “The key to effective taxation is 
information, and the key to information in the modern economy is the 
corporation. . . . The corporation is thus the modern fiscal state’s equivalent of 
 
STATES FROM THE 18TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY 83, 96 (Alexander Nützenadel & Christoph Strupp 
eds., 2007). 
 11. Max Weber, Sociological Categories of Economic Action, in ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN 
OUTLINE OF INTERPRETATIVE SOCIOLOGY 63, 90–92 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). 
 12. See generally DAVID BUNTING, THE RISE OF LARGE AMERICAN CORPORATIONS, 1889–1919 
(1987); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF BIG BUSINESS IN AMERICA, 
1880–1940 (1975); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN 
CAPITALISM, 1890–1916 (1988). 
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the customs barrier at the border.”13 This article synthesizes the public-finance 
literature on taxation and economic development with findings from U.S. 
economic and business history to explain how American economic development 
and the emergence of managerial corporate capitalism helped create the pivotal 
institutional foundations for the modern income tax.14 
In focusing on the economic conditions that paved the way for the income 
tax, this article does not contend that social and political factors were negligible 
or that economic growth inexorably determines changes in tax systems. Political 
interests and social turmoil were not exogenous variables. Rather, as public-
finance scholars have long noted,15 and a new wave of interdisciplinary 
scholarship has emphasized,16 social and political forces—not to mention 
cultural influences—have worked in concert with economic factors in shaping 
tax systems across place and time.17 The central aim of this article is to make a 
modest contribution to the legal and political historiography of the U.S. income 
tax by highlighting how changing material economic conditions afforded social 
groups, political reformers, and lawmakers a unique, historically contingent 
opportunity to transform the American tax system. 
Because social and political forces did, in fact, play an important role, this 
article begins, in part II, with a brief recapitulation of the standard sociopolitical 
accounts of the formation of the American income tax. It then turns in part III 
to a macro-level analysis of American economic development at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Using some conventional economic metrics, part III shows 
how the United States was gradually transformed from a mid-nineteenth-
century “developing” nation into the world’s leading industrial power by the 
start of World War I. Part IV focuses more specifically on how economic 
growth led to structural changes in the economy—changes that signaled the rise 
of a new form of capitalism in which salaried business executives employed 
innovative techniques to manage the processes of mass production and 
distribution. Part V shows how economic growth and the rise of managerial 
corporate capitalism helped establish the institutional framework that 
facilitated the development of the modern income tax. The article concludes in 
 
 13. Richard M. Bird, Why Tax Corporations?, 56 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 194, 
199 (2002). 
 14. This article uses the terms “institution” and “institutional” broadly to refer to what Douglass 
North has suggested are the “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” DOUGLASS 
C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990). 
 15. See generally MUSGRAVE, supra note 9; Hinrichs, supra note 9. 
 16. See generally THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE (Isaac William Martin, Ajay K. Mehrotra & Monica Prasad eds., 2009). 
 17. For more on the recent literature on economic development and tax structure, see generally 
Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal Income 
Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627 (2005); Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Tax 
Policy in Emerging Countries, 26 ENV’T & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y 73 (2008), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1307861; Robin Burgess & Nicolas Stern, Taxation and 
Development, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 762 (1993); Vito Tanzi & Howell H. Zee, Tax Policy for 
Emerging Markets: Developing Nations, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 299 (2000). 
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part VI with some closing remarks summarizing how American economic 
development and managerial corporate capitalism helped create the 
institutional foundations of the modern American income tax. 
II 
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF 
THE MODERN INCOME TAX 
Historians of American public finance who have explored the beginnings of 
the modern income tax have frequently disagreed about its ultimate impact, but 
nearly all have privileged the explanatory power of political actors and 
institutions, as well as the social forces calling for tax reform. From the late-
nineteenth-century populist demands for graduated income and wealth taxes to 
the political backlash against the Supreme Court’s decision in Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.18 to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment 
and the enactment of subsequent income-tax laws, the key historical agents in 
most conventional accounts have been the lower agrarian and laboring classes, 
and the politicians and lawmakers who have either fought on behalf of these 
producers or blunted their demands by siding with powerful business and 
economic interests. Although some scholars have paid passing reference to 
“stage[s] of economic development,”19 the fundamental drivers of historical 
change have been the social tensions between classes and the mediating role 
played by politics, especially during national emergencies such as wars and 
economic dislocations.20 
For an older generation of mainly economic and legal historians weaned on 
the politics of New Deal liberalism, the history of the income tax was very much 
a morality tale in which the forces of social democracy gradually triumphed 
over plutocracy. Written mainly as prologues for the victorious arrival of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, these teleological interpretations left little doubt that 
progressive lawmakers were critical to the formation of a new fiscal order. With 
the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and their 
congressional allies, fundamental tax reform was not only possible, it seemed 
preordained. For this older generation of scholars American fiscal history could 
not be separated from the populist demands of farmers and workers or the 
progressive political leaders who led the movement for tax reform.21 
Whereas these progressive historians equated early-twentieth-century tax 
reform with the triumphalism of American liberal democracy, a later generation 
of scholars from both the political left and right inverted the earlier narrative. 
The earlier generation celebrated the graduated income tax as a signal 
 
 18. 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
 19. SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 9 (1967). 
 20. See generally W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA (1996). 
 21. See generally ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1940); 
RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1954); RATNER, supra note 19. 
MEHROTRA 9/4/2010 11:12:25 AM 
Winter 2010]       AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 31 
achievement for American social democracy, but the new group of corporate-
liberal and neoconservative scholars contended that U.S. political institutions 
and actors could not be trusted to fulfill the will of the populace. Thus, 
corporate-liberal scholars from the left argued that the income tax was a hollow 
victory, a subtle and sophisticated form of conservatism, a clever plot to 
domesticate potentially more-radical forms of wealth redistribution.22 
Neoconservative scholars, using public-choice theory, agreed that the state had 
been captured, not by centrist capitalists, but by special economic interests who 
exploited the rent-seeking behavior of corrupt politicians.23 Others attached a 
similar negative connotation to the history of the American income tax; but 
rather than single out the machinations of political actors, these scholars 
focused on how the pluralism of American politics and the incrementalism of 
political change doomed the United States to a dysfunctional income-tax 
system.24 
In recent years, the historical literature on American tax policy has reflected 
a type of revival of the earlier progressive view, but one that is more attuned to 
historical contingency and the interactions between institutions and individual 
agents. Not only has this neoprogressive view informed a robust debate about 
the constitutional history surrounding the income tax,25 and the importance of 
modern industrialization,26 it has also led to a new “democratic institutionalist” 
model of American fiscal history that reemphasizes the relative autonomy of 
state power and the use of that power in the search for tax equity and social 
justice.27 
 
 22. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, 
at 19–27 (1992); ROBERT STANLEY, THE DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS 
OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861–1913 (1993). Other New Left interpretations have extended this 
analysis into later twentieth-century U.S. tax history. See, e.g., MARK LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC 
REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933–1939 (1984); JAMES O’CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS 
OF THE STATE (1973). 
 23. See generally ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH 
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987); Bennett D. Baack & Edward John Ray, Special Interests and the 
Adoption of the Income Tax in the United States, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 607 (1985). 
 24. See generally SHELDON D. POLLACK, THE FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY (1996); JOHN F. 
WITTE, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1985). For a comparative 
perspective on the limits of U.S. tax policy, see generally SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION & DEMOCRACY 
(1993). 
 25. For a sampling of the vast literature on the constitutional foundations of the income tax, see 
generally MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT (2003); CALVIN H. 
JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES (2005); Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the 
Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1999); Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct” Taxes: Are 
Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997); Leo P. Martinez, “To Lay and 
Collect Taxes”: The Constitutional Case for Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111 (1999). 
 26. See generally Kimberly J. Morgan & Monica Prasad, The Origins of Tax Systems: A French-
American Comparison, 114 AMER. J. SOC. 1350 (2009). 
 27. See generally BROWNLEE, supra note 20; STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 
(2002); TAX JUSTICE (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., eds., 2002). In reviving the earlier 
progressive interpretation of the beginnings of the income tax, more-recent scholars have also provided 
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Despite the stark scholarly differences over the ultimate meaning of 
Progressive Era tax reform, what unites these contending interpretations is an 
unwavering focus on politics, political institutions, and social tensions as the 
engines of historical change. Even those who examine big-picture changes focus 
on the political response to industrialization and central state authority.28 As 
one leading historian has explained, 
[N]o complex of economic factors, narrowly defined, can explain the centralization of 
government, the shifts in government functions, and changes in the structure of public 
finance. Explanation of the transitions must rest more heavily on an understanding of 
fundamental shifts in civic values, bound up in the workings of politics and political 
institutions, within the context of externally driven social crises.29 
The workings of politics, political institutions, and social crises certainly go a 
long way in explaining early-twentieth-century American tax reform. Massive 
social unrest, changing ideological perceptions, and shifting political power, as 
well as national emergencies, were all salient features in the development of the 
modern American income tax, as many of the other articles in this issue 
illustrate. But complex economic factors, broadly defined, had an equally 
significant influence. Whether one sees American economic growth as a 
prerequisite to the ultimate impact of political and social forces,30 or whether 
one describes economic development and material changes as working 
endogenously alongside and in unison with political ideology and social 
tensions, there is little doubt that the long-term process of American economic 
development had a resounding impact on the U.S. tax system. To understand 
the interaction among economic, political, and social forces, it may be useful to 
first summarize just how the United States progressed from a mid-nineteenth-
century “developing” nation to the world’s largest industrial power by the end 
of World War I. 
III 
FROM “DEVELOPING” NATION TO WORLD POWER: AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
During the long nineteenth century, the United States experienced 
tremendous economic growth. Because the economy generated a standard of 
 
strong empirical evidence from congressional roll-call votes to show how lawmakers from agrarian 
districts supported income taxes. See ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM 226–32 (1999). 
 28. See generally Morgan & Prasad, supra note 26. European political historians seem to be more 
attuned to the salience of economic factors in the development of fiscal policies. See, e.g., MARTIN 
DAUNTON, TRUSTING LEVIATHAN 14–16 (2001). See generally THE RISE OF THE FISCAL STATE IN 
EUROPE C. 1200–1815 (Richard Bonney ed., 2004). 
 29. W. Elliot Brownlee, The Public Sector, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1013, 1017 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman 
eds., 2000). 
 30. Richard Musgrave contended that economic growth provided lawmakers with greater 
flexibility in policy choices, and thus, by implication, fundamental and structural economic changes 
chronologically preceded the influence of social and political factors. MUSGRAVE, supra note 9, at 125–
67. 
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living that was relatively high, though uneven, the country could hardly be 
described as a “developing” nation by most present-day measures.31 To do so 
would belittle the challenges that continue to plague lesser developed countries 
today. Still, the United States did not become an international industrial power 
overnight. Economic growth and development, driven by an abundance of 
natural resources, technological innovation, and increasing factor inputs and 
productivity, helped transform an agriculturally based, seaboard economy into 
the world’s leading industrial, capitalist economy by the second decade of the 
twentieth century.32 Well before Henry Luce famously and bombastically 
predicted the triumphant arrival of the “American Century,” the United States 
was fast becoming the world’s leading economic power.33 The process of 
industrialization, which accelerated during the decades that straddled the turn 
of the twentieth century, was particularly important in shaping the institutional 
foundations of the modern income tax. 
From a comparative-historical perspective, the U.S. economy by the late 
nineteenth century had already achieved great success and was poised to 
become an international leader due in part to a unique array of material, 
technological, and natural-resource-based circumstances. Although precise 
historical comparisons across space and time, as scholars have noted, can be 
problematic,34 by most estimates, the United States by the 1870s had a large and 
rapidly growing economy. At that time, American per capita real-income levels 
were already among the highest in the world.35 The United States, for example, 
far outpaced countries like Russia, where average real income was about one-
half the American level, and even leading European colonial powers such as 
France and Germany had per capita real GDP figures that were roughly three-
fourths of U.S. levels.36 
Nonetheless, the United States was not the world’s dominant economy 
during the late nineteenth century. It not only lagged behind the United 
Kingdom—which had real per capita income levels in the 1870s that were about 
 
 31. Using a broad, structural perspective, some political historians have described the United 
States as a developing nation at the turn of the twentieth century because American politics has been a 
“function of the stages of development of a market society.” MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE UNITED STATES 
AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 19 (1992). 
 32. For a succinct summary of American economic growth during this period, see generally Robert 
E. Gallman, Economic Growth and Structural Change in the Long Nineteenth Century, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY, supra note 29, at 1; Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Stanley L. Engermann, 
History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World, 14 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 217 (2000); Gavin Wright, The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879–1940, 80 
AM. ECON. REV. 651 (1990). 
 33. See generally HENRY R. LUCE, THE AMERICAN CENTURY (1941). 
 34. ANGUS MADDISON, DYNAMIC FORCES IN CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 195–201 (1991). 
Despite several shortcomings, per capita real output can be a crude and imperfect proxy for economic 
success. For the purposes of measuring how economic growth facilitated the development of the 
income tax, the measure of market output and income may be particularly useful. On the limits of using 
per capita output measures, see generally SIMON KUZNETS, ECONOMIC CHANGE 145–91 (1953). 
 35. ANGUS MADDISON, MONITORING THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1820–1992, at 194–206 (1995). 
 36. Gallman, supra note 32, at 20. 
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30% greater than the United States—and other relatively small European 
dynamos like the Netherlands; the United States also trailed the colonial 
economies of Australia and New Zealand, which, with their small populations, 
copious natural resources, and large infusions of European capital, had greater 
real per capita income throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century.37 
By 1870, the United States was still far ahead of the leading economies of Asia 
(Indonesia) and Latin America (Argentina), but it was gaining on global 
leaders in terms of economic performance.38 
 
Chart 1. Real GDP per Capita, 1870–193039 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It did not take long, however, for the United States to surpass the United 
Kingdom and all other nations in terms of economic growth. The annual growth 
rate of American real per capita income during the turn of the century outpaced 
nearly all other nations, with the notable exception of Argentina, which 
witnessed unprecedented growth rates due mainly to the productivity of fertile 
land, the export of agricultural goods, and the subsequent investment of 
European capital.40 Whereas average real income in the United Kingdom grew 
at an annual rate of roughly 1% between 1870 and 1930, the United States 
experienced a 2.6% annual growth rate over the same period.41 Moreover, as the 
use of per capita–series rather than aggregate-output data shows, the last third 
 
 37. In 1870, U.S. real GDP per capita was roughly $2457 (in 1990 Geary–Khamis dollars), far 
below estimates for the United Kingdom ($3263) and Australia ($3801). MADDISON, supra note 35, at 
194–96. 
 38. See infra Chart 1. 
 39. MADDISON, supra note 35, at 194–206. 
 40. ROBERTO CORTÉS CONDE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARGENTINA IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 14–39 (2009). For more on Argentina’s late-nineteenth-century exceptional economic 
growth and then its subsequent late-twentieth-century decline, see generally A NEW ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF ARGENTINA (Gerardo della Paolera & Alan M. Taylor eds., 2003). 
 41. See infra Table A. 
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of the nineteenth century was a particularly pronounced era of American 
economic development compared to other nations and past periods.42 
Technological innovations as well as increased productivity of input factors, 
particularly capital, led to a modern period of industrialization that was at the 
center of American per capita–output growth.43 Those who benefited most from 
these economic gains, namely investors, manufacturers, merchants, and 
business managers, would soon become the leading sources of income-tax 
revenue. 
 
Table A 
Average Annual Real GDP Growth per Capita, 1870–193044 
 
 
Because of the rapid surge in economic growth at the turn of the century, 
the United States emerged as the world’s leading economy by the 1920s. Well 
before then, contemporaries could foresee the coming dominance of American 
economic might. As one British journalist noted in 1901, “The most serious 
aspect of the American industrial invasion lies in the fact that these newcomers 
have acquired control of almost every new industry created during the past 
fifteen years.” After rattling off a long list of modern devices, including “the 
telephone, the portable camera, the phonograph, the electric street car, the 
automobile,” and “the typewriter,” the English writer concluded that “in every 
one of these . . . the American maker is supreme; in several he is a 
monopolist.”45 Comparative historical data corroborates these remarks. By the 
end of World War I, average real income in the United States was nearly 20% 
 
 42. Using real, per capita, gross national product figures, Robert Gallman has estimated that the 
American economy grew by an annual rate of 2.4% between 1869 and 1909, far greater than in any 
other prior long-term period. Gallman, supra note 32, at 22. 
 43. JOHN W. KENDRICK, PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 464 (1961); Paul 
Bairoch, International Industrialization Levels from 1750–1980, 11 J. EUR. ECON. HIST. 269, 297 (1982). 
 44. MADDISON, supra note 35, at 194–206. 
 45. FREDERICK ARTHUR MCKENZIE, THE AMERICAN INVADERS 31 (1901). 
 1870–1900 1900–1930 1870–1930 
United States 2.2% 1.7% 2.6% 
United Kingdom 1.4% 0.4% 1.0% 
Netherlands 1.1% 1.8% 1.8% 
Australia 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
Argentina 3.7% 1.6% 3.5% 
Indonesia 0.4% 2.0% 1.4% 
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greater than in the United Kingdom, and almost 10% greater than in 
Australia.46 
American labor and capital productivity at the turn of the century 
transformed the country into the world’s largest producer of goods and services. 
In fact, even before the start of the Great War, “[a]ggregate annual output was 
greater in the United States than in the three main World War I belligerents—
the United Kingdom, Germany, and France—combined.”47 With an increasing 
proportion of output moving through the market, the potential income-tax base 
grew significantly. In addition, as the industrial economy shifted from a 
structure of entrepreneurial capitalism to corporate capitalism, characterized by 
larger organizational units of production and distribution, government tax 
authorities were able to collect taxes more easily. 
Economic output was not the only way in which the United States created 
the critical mass that facilitated the base for modern income taxation. By many 
other measures of modern development, the United States also made great 
strides at the turn of the century. Average life expectancy increased, infant 
mortality declined,48 and education levels rose sharply.49 These changes led to a 
healthier and more educated workforce that would soon come to occupy pivotal 
positions in the development of the modern income tax. Skilled employees were 
fast becoming the salaried managers of the burgeoning new industrial 
corporations. An increasing number of service professionals, such as doctors 
and lawyers, were also earning greater market incomes that could be tapped by 
the new tax regime.50 And there was a growing number of capital owners and 
investors who were profiting from American industrialization.51 In time, each of 
these groups would be among the country’s leading taxpayers. 
The other side of the tax system also benefited from a prosperous and highly 
educated labor force. The increased administrative capacity necessary to assess 
and collect income taxes rested heavily on an educated and trained government 
 
 46. See supra Chart 1. By 1920, U.S. real GDP per capita was approximately $5600 (in 1990 
dollars), while U.K. levels were at about $4650, and Australia’s was just above $5000. MADDISON, 
supra note 35, at 194–96. 
 47. Gallman, supra note 32, at 6. 
 48. Life expectancy among whites increased from forty-five years in 1870 to nearly sixty-one years 
by 1930. The infant-mortality rate, defined as the number of infant deaths per 1,000 live births per 
annum, declined from 175 among whites to 60 by 1870. Sumner J. La Croix, Government and the 
People: Labor, Education, and Health, in GOVERNMENT & THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 323, 326–27 
(2007). 
 49. HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 2006) 2-464 to  
-468 tbl.Bc737–792. For more on the growing demand for high-school education during this period, see 
generally Claudia Goldin, The Human-Capital Century and American Leadership: Virtues of the Past, 
61 J. ECON. HIST. 263 (2001). 
 50. Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 1870–2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA, at 73, 93 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). 
 51. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY 103 (2007); see also Julia C. Ott, 
“The Free and Open People’s Market”: Political Ideology and Retail Brokerage at the New York Stock 
Exchange, 1913–1933, 96 J. AM. HIST. 44 (2009). 
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bureaucracy—the human capital of the public sector. The growth of the public 
sector in the early twentieth century, particularly within the U.S. Treasury 
Department, would become, as we shall see, vital to the development of an 
effective income tax.52 The expansion of national administrative capacity was, in 
turn, a function of complex historical forces. In this sense, American economic 
progress certainly provided new tax “handles” and greater administrative 
capacity for state authorities, but how such growth and government capacity 
would be put to use was frequently a socially and politically contested issue.53 
Ultimately, though, economic growth and development, by itself, was not 
enough to provide the proper handles and capacity for the new income-tax 
regime. Economic growth premised only on increased agricultural productivity 
or an increasing number of small-scale merchants and artisans engaged in 
numerous small, perhaps even barter, transactions would not have provided the 
organizational or institutional framework for the development of an effective 
income tax. What was even more critical than the increasing amount of national 
income and output flowing through a national, regulated market was the 
structural transformation in the American economy that accompanied modern 
economic growth, namely the pronounced shift from agriculture to large-scale 
manufacturing that was at the heart of modern American industrialization. 
Moreover, by helping supplant household production and barter transactions 
with a more liquid cash economy, modern industrialization facilitated the 
measurement and collection of income taxes. The cash nexus provided a 
medium of exchange and standardized equivalence that tax authorities could 
accurately rely on to measure and assess income.54 Massive industrialization at 
the turn of the twentieth century was also accompanied by seminal changes in 
the size and scale of the organizational units of economic production and 
distribution, and the attendant standardization of managerial and accounting 
methods. These two institutional changes had a profound impact in shaping the 
expansion of the modern income tax. 
IV 
MODERN AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE ADVENT OF 
MANAGERIAL CORPORATE CAPITALISM 
During the antebellum period, particularly the 1840s and 1850s, the United 
States reaped the benefits of early technological innovation and 
 
 52. See infra text accompanying notes 125–32. 
 53. For more on the political and social construction of bureaucratic public power during this 
period, see generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: 
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001). 
 54. Gabriel Ardant, Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations, in 
THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 164, 218 (Charles Tilly ed., 1975). 
Although a cash economy had come to replace barter transactions in the United States much earlier 
than the late nineteenth century, the pervasiveness of market transactions took on a new meaning with 
the mass production and distribution of American industrialization. 
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industrialization. But it was in the six decades or so that followed the Civil War 
that technological advancements related to the second industrial revolution 
profoundly transformed the size and structure of the U.S. economy.55 Impressive 
technological improvements in transportation and communications linked a 
continental nation and helped create a mass market for production and 
distribution. Leading industrialists, like James Buchanan Duke, harnessed new 
technologies to make the production process more efficient and to help increase 
the national demand for consumer products. During the 1880s, Duke led his 
company into the cigarette-manufacturing business by employing new cigarette-
rolling machines that significantly decreased the time and labor necessary to roll 
cigarettes.  He also used the nascent advertising industry and a new system of 
merchandising to increase the consumer demand for his product.  By 1890, 
Duke dominated the cigarette market, consolidating the four leading cigarette 
producing companies into the American Tobacco Company.56 
 As the railroads and telegraph system spread, large-scale integrated 
industrial corporations, like the American Tobacco Company, emerged to take 
advantage of the economies of scale provided by the new, high-volume 
technologies. By combining the techniques of mass production and distribution 
within single business entities, the colossal new industrial corporations ushered 
in a new era of American capitalism. Accordingly, the industrial sector of the 
economy quickly eclipsed the agricultural segment, and new forms of economic 
organization and management paved the way for a more effective use of direct 
and progressive taxes on personal and corporate incomes. 
There was perhaps no greater evidence of the seismic shift in the economy 
occasioned by industrialization than the changing sectoral composition of 
economic output and employment. As late as 1879, agriculture accounted for 
about half of the total value added in the economy’s commodity output; at that 
same time, manufacturing was responsible for roughly a one-third share.57 
Within two decades, the two sectors had completely reversed positions. 
Manufacturing became the dominant segment of the economy by 1899, with a 
53% share of output, while the agricultural proportion dropped to roughly one-
third. And by 1929, the estimated divergence between the two leading 
commodity-producing sectors had become even more pronounced.58 
 
 
 55. For a succinct summary of the numerous forces driving nineteenth-century American 
industrialization, see generally Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Technology and 
Industrialization, 1790–1914, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY, supra note 29, at 367. 
 56. ROBERT F. DURDEN, THE DUKES OF DURHAM, 1865–1929, Ch. 3 (1987); ROBERT L. 
HEILBRONER & AARON SINGER, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 155 (1994). 
 57. Robert E. Gallman, Commodity Output, 1839–1899, in 24 THE CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH 
IN INCOME AND WEALTH, TRENDS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
(STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH) 26 (1960) (All figures are in constant 1879 dollars.). 
 58. See Robert E. Gallman & Edward S. Howle, Trends in the Structure of the American Economy 
Since 1840, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 25, 26 (Robert W. Fogel 
& Stanley L. Engerman eds., 1971); infra Table B. 
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Table B 
Sector Shares of Value Added in Commodity Production, 1879–192959 
 
   1879  1889  1899  1909  1919  1929 
Agriculture 49  37  33  26  22  17 
Industry       74  78  83 
Mining 3  4  5       
Manufacturing 37  48  53       
Construction 11  11  9       
 
 
The rise of late-nineteenth-century American industrial might was even 
more evident when viewed from a comparative perspective. Focusing 
specifically on industrial output, economic historians have shown how the last 
decades of the nineteenth century were particularly critical for American 
development. Whereas in 1880 the United States was fourth in terms of per 
capita levels of industrial output (well behind the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and Sweden), soon after 1900 the United States had surpassed the United 
Kingdom to become the world leader.60 The growing U.S. share of world 
industrial output similarly illustrates the rise of American manufacturing 
leadership. Between 1880 and 1900, the United States supplanted the United 
Kingdom as the world leader in terms of relative share of international 
industrial output.61 Incidentally, those nation-states that industrialized earlier 
were also the first to adopt direct taxes. The United Kingdom and Germany, for 
instance, enacted income taxes well before the United States, suggesting that 
some minimum level of economic growth and industrial concentration is 
necessary for the viability of individual- and corporate-income taxes.62 
 
 59. Gallman & Howle, supra note 58, at 26. 
 60. Bairoch, supra note 43, at 294, 302; Wright, supra note 32, at 652. 
 61. Bairoch, supra note 43, at 296 tbl.10, 304 tbl.13; infra Chart 2. 
 62. MUSGRAVE, supra note 9, at 371–73. 
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Chart 2.  Relative Shares of World Industrial Output 1860–192863 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical changes in the distribution of U.S. employment mirrored the 
sectoral shift in output and the comparative data on American industrial power. 
Whereas more than half of all U.S. workers were farmers or farm laborers in 
1870, that figure dropped to roughly one-fifth by 1930.64 Although the increase 
in the share of manufacturing employment was not as pronounced, mainly 
because of the changing census definition of manufacturing workers and 
because of the productivity increases in output per worker, the gains were still 
significant.65 In 1870, only about 19% of the labor force was dedicated to 
manufacturing; by 1920 that figure had jumped to nearly 27%.66 The shift from 
agricultural employment to manufacturing increased the number of wage-
earning workers with more-regular and precise incomes. Furthermore, because 
farmers, especially subsistence farmers, were frequently difficult to tax, the 
sectoral shift in employment from agriculture to manufacturing also aided the 
effectiveness of tax collection.67 
As more and more Americans became tied to the market for wage labor, 
their salaries became susceptible to income taxes. To be sure, the vast majority 
of ordinary workers were immune from the early-twentieth-century income tax. 
In fact, political leaders and tax reformers consciously framed the modern 
income tax as a levy mainly on the rich and affluent.68 As Congressman Cordell 
Hull, one of the chief architects of the 1913 income tax explained, the central 
goal of the progressive income tax was to ensure that “the wealth of the country 
should bear its just share of the burden of taxation and that it should not be 
 
 63. Bairoch, supra note 43, at 296 tbl.10, 304 tbl.13. 
 64. Stanley Lebergott, Labor Force and Employment, 1800–1960, in OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND 
PRODUCTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER 1800, at 119 (1966). 
 65. ROBERT HIGGS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1865–1914, at 48–49 
(1971). 
 66. Lebergott, supra note 64, at 119. 
 67. EDWARD D. ALLEN & O.H. BROWNLEE, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 293 (1947). 
 68. Brownlee, supra note 29, at 1023. 
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permitted to shirk that duty.”69 Still, industrialization not only drove workers 
from rural farms to urban industries, it also created vast, though uneven, 
amounts of wealth and facilitated the rise of a new managerial class of business 
executives. These salaried executives and the new, highly integrated, industrial 
enterprises they managed would soon become the leading sources of the early, 
class-based income taxes. 
Indeed, the modern industrial business corporation, administered by a 
hierarchy of salaried professionals, was the hallmark of managerial corporate 
capitalism. In earlier times, nearly all business firms were single-unit enterprises 
owned and operated by a sole individual or small group of individuals who 
responded to market prices and provided a solitary economic function—be it a 
retail shop, factory, or bank—out of a lone location. Before the railroad and 
telegraphic system became fully operational in the 1880s, these small firms 
rarely competed with each other in a national market, nor did they have the 
communication capabilities to manage and coordinate several scattered 
operating units. Without a need for managerial supervision, these traditional, 
often family-owned, companies combined the responsibilities of ownership and 
control.70 Simply put, in these preindustrial businesses, “owners managed and 
managers owned.”71 
In stark contrast, the modern business enterprise, which was usually 
organized as a corporation,72 was a large-scale firm with integrated multiple 
units that performed a variety of economic activities across a vast area of 
operations. The complex and numerous production and distribution activities of 
these new firms were monitored and coordinated by a hierarchy of salaried 
managers who generally had little equity stake in the businesses they operated.73 
Unlike the swashbuckling captains of industry from an earlier generation, the 
administrators of the modern business corporation were organizational men—
and they were nearly all men—dedicated to the long-run viability of their 
business organizations. They were, in short, business bureaucrats.74 
Modern business managers guided the expansion of their enterprises both 
internally and through mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, between 1895 and 
1904, in what is known as the “great merger movement,” manufacturing firms 
consolidated at a remarkable, breakneck pace due to a confluence of historical 
 
 69. CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 58 (1948). 
 70. CHANDLER, supra note 12, at 1–12. 
 71. Id. at 9. 
 72. Though there were notable exceptions such as the Ford Motor Company which remained a sole 
proprietorship well into the twentieth century, the vast majority of industrial enterprises were 
organized as legal corporations. RICHARD S. TEDLOW, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS 
CORPORATION 5 (1991). 
 73. CHANDLER, supra note 12, at 7–10. The growing separation of ownership and control was, of 
course, a great concern for corporate-law scholars and policymakers. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, 
JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 74. HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 56, at 77–85. 
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factors.75 During that time, nearly two thousand companies combined with 
former rivals to create some of the country’s largest industrial corporations. 
Duke’s American Tobacco Company, for instance, embarked in the early 1890s 
on a series of mergers and internal expansions that led it to control nearly 80% 
of the entire tobacco industry.76  As a result, American Tobacco’s market 
capitalization skyrocketed from $25 million in 1890 to approximately $500 
million by 1904.77  Though the “visible hand of management”78 helped determine 
the success of many mergers, the growth of financial intermediaries with 
increasing access to international capital markets was equally important. 
Whereas earlier transportation companies relied mainly on the issuance of 
public and private debt, the great merger movement accelerated the 
institutional convergence of American industrial manufacturing and finance 
capital.79 Banks and other financial institutions prospered, and the ownership of 
large corporate organizations became increasingly dispersed as the American 
spirit of financial speculation and the ideology of a “shareholder democracy” 
began to take hold.80 
The emergence of large, integrated corporations is frequently depicted as a 
functional response to the technological changes of modern industrialization, or 
as an inevitable concomitant of economic growth. Their evolution, however, 
was hardly natural or inexorable.81 Like all institutions, these new economic 
organizations were populated by human agents who used resources and power 
to further their beliefs and interests during historically specific moments.82 The 
individuals, for example, who came to occupy the rungs of middle and upper 
management at the leading American industrial corporations were, by and 
large, members of an upper class imbued with economic and political authority. 
Highly educated and frequently well connected, these business bureaucrats had 
every incentive to perpetuate the power and prestige of a management 
structure that was fast producing the next generation of business leaders.83 
 
 75. NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–
1904, at 1 (1985). See generally ROBERT L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 
1895–1956 (1959). 
 76. DURDEN, supra note 56, at 62. 
 77. Id. at 57; Thomas K. McCraw, Business & Government: The Origins of the Adversary 
Relationship, 26 CAL. MGMT. REV. 33, 42 (1984). 
 78. WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL 7 (1997). 
 79. Id. at 49–50. 
 80. See ROY, supra note 78, at 4. On the rise of financial speculation and the ideology of a so-called 
“shareholder democracy,” see generally MITCHELL, supra note 51; Ott, supra note 51. 
 81. For a critique of the structural functionalism that underpins the Chandlerian account, see 
generally ROY, supra note 78; Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). 
On more recent challenges to the economic description of the seemingly natural rise of the modern 
corporation, see generally CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE 
(Kenneth Lipartito & David B. Sicilia eds., 2004). 
 82. James T. Kloppenburg, Institutionalism, Rational Choice and Historical Analysis, 28 POLITY 
125 (1995). 
 83. HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 56, at 80–81. 
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Likewise, the growth of the corporate form as a legal entity had its own 
social and cultural history, one that exacerbated the defects of the existing 
nineteenth-century U.S. tax system. On the one hand, the pervasiveness of large 
corporations throughout American society helped establish the social 
legitimacy of an economic organization in a political culture that was regularly 
suspicious of concentrated power.84 Indeed, well before the economic-
productivity gains of American industrialism took hold, corporations were 
completing the cultural spade work that would ensure the existence of large-
scale businesses and hence the subsequent development of the income tax. In 
the process, Big Business corporations were also playing an important role 
through tax withholding and other reporting measures in educating and 
socializing their dividend-receiving owners and their salaried managers about 
the process of tax compliance. 
On the other hand, the rise of corporate capitalism and the concomitant 
increase in intangible wealth in the form of corporate securities placed greater 
pressure on prevailing tax systems and provided social and political reformers 
with an opportunity to advance income taxes as a substitute for the federal tariff 
and subnational property taxes. The national tariff, which was no longer simply 
protecting infant industries but seemed to be shielding domestic monopolies 
from foreign competition, was blamed for fostering the creation of large 
business combinations known as trusts.85 At the state and local level, the 
inability of general property taxes to capture the wealth of large shareholders 
animated agrarian populists and legal reformers who sought to use the income 
tax as a viable alternative to property taxes.86 The drawbacks of the existing 
framework of the American tax system combined with the economic changes 
wrought by industrialism fueled the social and political calls for income 
taxation. Thus, although industrialization and the rise of managerial corporate 
capitalism were important influences on the creation and elaboration of the 
modern income tax, the adoption of income taxes did not inescapably flow from 
economic forces, but rather was conditioned by social and political power and 
complex historical processes. Social and political variables, in other words, were 
endogenously related to the economic factors shaping the modern income tax. 
There were other modern forces related to industrialization that affected the 
arrival of managerial capitalism—and subsequently the development of the 
income tax—in various ways. Rapid urbanization, for instance, supported the 
creation of mass production and distribution, and in turn indirectly expanded 
the possibilities for new types of taxes. Between 1880 and 1910, the proportion 
of Americans living in urban areas (defined as locations with more than 2,500 
 
 84. ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA (1982); OLIVIER ZUNZ, 
MAKING AMERICA CORPORATE, 1870–1920 (1992); J. WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970 (1970). 
 85. See generally BYRON WEBBER HOLT, THE TARIFF: THE MOTHER OF TRUSTS (1899). 
 86. MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY 210–20 (1990). 
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persons) more than doubled, and the share of those living in large cities 
(defined as locations with more than 100,000 persons) nearly quadrupled.87 
The lure of factory jobs in mass-production processes certainly pulled 
Americans into urban areas. The exodus from small rural communities to large 
urban areas also led to the creation of a vast market of consumers who were 
willing to purchase standard, mass-produced goods that were generally less 
costly than the aesthetically specialized and individualized designs of craftsmen. 
Ironically, the growth of the mass-consumption market provided opportunities 
for the enactment of sales taxes. As large department stores and chain stores 
began to eclipse the small-scale general country store,88 government tax 
authorities could more easily assess consumption taxes, like a retail-sales tax. 
Some state governments exploited this revenue stream during the early 
twentieth century, beginning with levies on specific consumption items such as 
cigarettes and gasoline.89 
Over time, sales taxes became the prerogative of state governments.  As 
states and commonwealths came to rely on sales taxes as an increasingly 
important source of revenue, they resisted federal encroachments on this tax 
base.  In the process, they staked out important ground in the ongoing 
intergovernmental tension that was characteristic of the history of American 
fiscal federalism. Indeed, the politics of fiscal federalism may explain in part 
why subsequent attempts at adopting a federal sales tax were thwarted.90 Yet in 
the early twentieth century the rise of a mass-consumption market suggests that 
the development of the income tax was not preordained, that it was profoundly 
shaped by social and political factors. Economic growth and urban 
industrialization provided policymakers with multiple “tax handles”; but it was 
mainly social crisis and political leadership particularly during the 1940s that 
prevented the development of a national retail-sales tax and reinforced the 
federal reliance on progressive income taxes.91 
One reason why the federal sales tax did not gain sufficient currency among 
lawmakers and policy analysts was because consumption levies had long been 
assumed to be the most regressive of taxes, extracting revenue from those least 
able to pay. Since the late nineteenth century, regressive taxes were associated 
with a period of rising income and wealth inequality.  The growing disparity of 
wealth during the Gilded Age was also linked to the rise of corporate 
 
 87. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 1-102 tbl.Aa684–698, 1-103 tbl.Aa699–715. See also 
Mark Guglielmo & Werner Troesken, The Gilded Age, in GOVERNMENT & THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY 255, 275 (2007). 
 88. MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, A HISTORY OF SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICA 64–66 (2003). 
 89. JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE 
GOVERNMENT 135–37 (2002). 
 90. ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT: HOW PROPERTY TAXES 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 79–80 (2008). 
 91. Lawrence Zelenak, The Federal Retail Sales Tax that Wasn’t: An Actual History and An 
Alternative History, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Winter 2010); see also STEVEN A. BANK, KIRK 
J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES 93–95 (2008). 
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capitalism.  As a result, large, wealthy corporations became targets of populist 
protests, and lawmakers began using tax policy as a cudgel to try to control the 
growth of Big Business.92 Given the limited amount of statistical data on 
nineteenth-century wealth and income, modern economic historians tend to 
disagree about the extent of economic inequality in the late 1800s,93 but most 
seem to concur that between the Civil War and the Great Depression a high 
degree of income inequality reached an “uneven plateau,” whereby the share of 
national income received by top income earners was consistent and peaked 
during particular moments, including the eve of U.S. entry into World War I.94 
The Great War itself had a tremendous leveling effect on income inequality, 
due in no small part to the “soak the rich” tax laws of the period, but higher 
levels of income disparity reappeared during the 1920s, reaching similar peaks 
on the eve of the 1929 stock-market crash.95 
Contemporary commentators were not oblivious to the growing disparity of 
wealth. Writing in 1893, the federal statistician George K. Holmes used census 
data to estimate that the richest 9% of American families owned about 70% of 
national assets.96 The social consequences of such inequality seemed obvious. 
“There is always the danger,” wrote Holmes, that the rich “will get too large a 
hold upon the wealth, the resources, and the labor of the country,” in which 
case “the most effective and practical remedies are progressive taxes on 
incomes, gifts, and inheritances.” Holmes contended that it was only through 
such political and legal measures that society could ensure “a distribution . . . 
most conducive to social welfare.”97 
Holmes’s remarks were emblematic of the era. Social commentators echoed 
alarmist warnings about swollen fortunes, and these sociopolitical concerns 
helped galvanize public support for the corporate tax and the Sixteenth 
Amendment.98 The growing social anxiety and the calls for political and legal 
reforms illustrate how economic factors were intertwined with other forces in 
helping shape the adoption and expansion of the modern income tax. 
Industrialization and the advent of managerial corporate capitalism provided 
 
 92. Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1212–30; Kornhauser supra note 6, at 53–54. 
 93. Clayne Pope, Inequality in the Nineteenth Century, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY 109, 142 (Stanley L. Gallman & Robert 
E. Engerman eds., 2000). 
 94. JEFFERY G. WILLIAMSON & PETER H. LINDERT, AMERICAN INEQUALITY: A 
MACROECONOMIC HISTORY 75–79 (1980). The spread in pay rations between highly paid and low-paid 
jobs parallels the income inequality seen in the share of income going to the top 1% of income 
recipients. Id. at 80–92. 
 95. Id. See generally L. Soltow, Evidence on Income Inequality in the United States, 1866–1965, 29 J. 
ECON. HIST. 279 (1969); R.S. Tucker, The Distribution of Income Among Income Taxpayers in the 
United States, 1863–1935, 52 Q. J. ECON. 547 (1938). 
 96. George K. Holmes, The Concentration of Wealth, 8 POL. SCI. Q. 589, 592 (1893). Others 
corroborated Holmes’ findings. CHARLES S. SPAHR, AN ESSAY ON THE PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF 
WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1896). 
 97. Holmes, supra note 96, at 599–600. 
 98. RATNER, supra note 19, at 254. 
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the broader context, but historically specific social tensions and political actions 
triggered fundamental changes to the institutional structure of American tax 
law and policy. In this way, sociopolitical forces were bound up with broader 
economic transformations. 
V 
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
MODERN INCOME TAX 
Many of the economic changes wrought by the ascent of industrialization 
and managerial corporate capitalism gradually had a profound impact on the 
development of the modern income tax. Unsurprisingly, the concentration of 
large-scale business enterprises had a direct influence on the elaboration of the 
corporate-income tax. Not only was Big Business an easy political target for 
populist reformers and progressive leaders, who could point to wealthy business 
enterprises as potential sources of badly needed government revenue; these 
large-scale industrial organizations also provided government tax authorities 
significant administrative assistance. The consolidation of numerous, scattered, 
specialized enterprises into fewer integrated, multi-unit big businesses eased the 
administrative burden on corporate-tax collections. 
It was not only the corporate-income tax, however, that benefited from the 
rise of American Big Business; the individual-, or personal-, income tax also 
prospered. The top managers and dispersed owners of the new corporate 
behemoths became leading payers of the personal-income tax. In fact, over 
time, professional salaries and dividend income became an increasingly 
significant part of individual-income-tax revenues. In addition to helping create 
the wealth and earnings that were susceptible to personal-income-tax laws, the 
large industrial corporations were also pivotal intermediaries in the tax-
collection process. In the early years of the corporate tax, they were remittance 
vehicles for a corporate levy that was arguably aimed at shareholders. In later 
years, when early and crude forms of income tax withholding were adopted and 
the deliberate double taxation of corporate income took hold, these business 
corporations became more-direct and purposeful collection agents for the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 
Yet the expansion of both the corporate- and individual-income tax may not 
have been possible were it not for the systematic changes in the way modern 
business enterprises precisely calculated their costs and revenues. Innovations 
in accounting that emerged from the careful coordination of mass production 
and distribution facilitated—inadvertently perhaps—the development of the 
modern income tax by giving government organizations ample opportunities to 
assess and collect corporate profits and personal incomes. It was this multitude 
of economic changes ushered in by managerial corporate capitalism that helped 
shape the institutional foundations of the modern income tax. 
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A.  Big Business and the Development of the Corporate-Income Tax 
Even before the 1909 levy, business corporations had been among the 
favorite tax targets of subnational lawmakers and policy analysts. The 
nineteenth-century general property tax administered by state and local 
governments gained much of its revenue from the property of local utilities and 
street railways, as well as the tracks and property used by national railroads. 
State and local governments also imposed gross-receipts taxes on businesses, 
which accounted for a substantial amount of subnational revenue. In fact, in 
several states such as California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, corporate taxes 
generated the majority of total annual tax receipts in the early twentieth 
century.99 
The increasing demand for public spending on education, hospitals, and 
internal improvements drove the desire of state lawmakers to turn to business 
corporations for greater tax revenue.100 An equally important component was 
the anxiety created by the growing economic power of Big Business. Drawing 
on a deep-seated antimonopoly tradition, agrarian populists feared that modern 
business corporations were quickly eliminating the traditional way of life of 
many yeoman farmers, relegating them to the dustbin of history. Likewise, local 
merchants feared the concentration of monopoly power in the hands of 
northeastern industrial elites. The taxation of large-scale modern corporations 
was thus part of the overall American political preoccupation with using state 
power to control the rise of corporate capitalism and the growing power of 
economic elites.101 
Indeed, American statecraft has long been distinguished by its antagonism 
towards Big Business. As political and business historians have demonstrated, 
the early arrival of American managerial corporate capitalism in the mid to late 
1800s preceded, and in some ways compelled, the subsequent development of 
the modern regulatory and administrative state. Consequently, a unique 
American divide between private enterprise and public administration began to 
develop.102 Although antitrust law is generally the policy arena that scholars 
 
 99. R. RUDY HIGGENS-EVENSON, PRICE OF PROGRESS 14, 80, 132–33 (2003). 
 100. Id. at 65. 
 101. On the antimonopoly ideas of populism, see generally GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND 
GREENBACKS (1999); LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT (1978). On the small-business 
resistance to industrial elites, see generally Richard Sylla, The Progressive Era and the Political 
Economy of Big Government, 5 CRITICAL REV. 531 (1991); Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and 
the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 637 (1978). 
 102. “Because two sets of administrative hierarchies grew at different periods of time for different 
reasons to carry out different functions with different objectives, two quite different cultures 
appeared,” explained Chandler in his classic essay. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Government Versus 
Business: An American Phenomenon, in BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (John Dunlop ed., 1980). 
“The work, attitudes, and perspectives of the business manager and the civil servant became and 
remained almost as distinct and separate as those of the humanist and the scientist.” Id. See generally 
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM (2001); DAVID VOGEL, KINDRED STRANGERS (1996); 
REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981); Morton J. 
Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982). 
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have explored to substantiate this claim,103 the tensions between American 
government and Big Business can also be clearly seen in the evolution of U.S. 
corporate-tax laws and policies. 
During the political debates over the modern income tax, the proper 
taxation of modern business corporations was a central concern. For lawmakers 
drafting the 1894 income tax, the decision to impose a separate corporate-level 
tax was a direct result of the social and political desires to punish large, abusive 
corporations. “[T]he sentiment that in some way or another the Legislature 
must get at the corporation,” explained one U.S. senator, “accounts for the tax 
upon the incomes of corporations.” The prevailing “sentiment seems to be that 
if a corporation does anything wrong, strike at all corporations, tax them.”104 
Although most contemporary economic experts agreed that the incidence of 
corporate taxes was relatively uncertain, the overwhelming perception of 
corporate tax proponents was that it ultimately hit owners of capital, and not 
labor or consumers. Similar attitudes drove the debates over the 1909 corporate 
levy and the 1913 tax. And the objections to the new corporate taxes validated 
that they were indeed perceived as punitive measures by the owners and 
managers of large-scale business corporations who were nominally forced to 
pay these levies. 
Though the motivations behind the early corporate taxes may have been to 
punish economic elites, these laws initially raised only moderate amounts of 
revenue, at least until the economic, social, and political conditions surrounding 
World War I dramatically transformed all aspects of American public finance.105 
The 1909 corporate excise tax, for example, imposed only a flat, 1% levy on net 
corporate income above $5,000.106 The 1913 income tax maintained a flat 1%, 
but removed any exemption level.107 These measures raised some revenue, but it 
was not until World War I, when new war and excess-profits taxes were added 
to higher ordinary corporate-income taxes, that business corporations became 
an integral part of the revenue-raising machinery. From 1916 through 1919, 
Congress enacted a series of tax laws aimed at extracting revenue from those 
industries and individuals who were believed to be profiting most from the war 
effort. In 1918, during the peak of the wartime tax regime, profits and income 
taxes on corporations generated roughly $3.1 billion out of total tax revenue of 
about $4.3 billion, thus accounting for nearly three-quarters of total revenue.108 
 
 103. See generally Thomas K. McCraw, Rethinking the Trust Question, in REGULATION IN 
PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 1 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981). 
 104. RICHARD J. JOSEPH, THE ORIGINS OF THE INCOME TAX 84 (2004) (quoting Senator Platt). 
 105. DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 112 
(2004). 
 106. Corporation Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909). 
 107. Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913). Because the Sixteenth 
Amendment had obviated the need for framing the levy as an excise tax, the 1913 tax was expressly 
imposed as a levy on net corporate income. 
 108. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, 
COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1925, at 23 (1927). 
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What is even more significant than the revenue eventually raised by 
corporate taxes is the type of business firms that were remitting the early levies. 
The large-scale industrial corporations that had ushered in a new era of 
managerial capitalism soon became the largest sources of corporate-income and 
profits taxes, especially during World War I. Corporations classified by the BIR 
as part of “manufacturing and mechanical industries” accounted for nearly half 
of all corporate-income-tax revenue, and about a quarter of overall tax revenue 
in 1916.109 By 1918, manufacturing was responsible for nearly half of all total tax 
revenue, accounting for $2.1 billion of the total $4.2 billion raised by both 
corporate and personal taxes.110 
 
Table C 
Leading Sources of Early Corporate Tax Revenue, by Industry, 1916–1930 
(nominal dollars in thousands and as percentage of total tax revenue)111 
 
 1916  1920  1925  1930  
Manufacturing  $ 81,260  24%  $ 944,960  35% $ 546,740  29%  $ 316,991  27% 
 
Transportation 
and Public Utilities  $ 30,160  9%  $ 98,623  4% $ 186,313  10%  $ 156,573  13% 
 
Finance, Banking, 
Insurance, etc.  $ 10,505  3%  $ 119,001  4% $ 179,948  9%  $ 109,455  9% 
 
Trade    $ 192,612  7% $ 145,349  8%  $ 64,165  5% 
 
Mining  $ 15,846  5%  $ 174,595  6% $ 55,048  3%  $ 21,474  2% 
 
A closer analysis of corporate-tax revenues by leading industries during the 
early years of income taxation suggests that Big Business remained a significant 
source of tax revenue, even as war and excess-profits levies were repealed in the 
1920s. Despite the paucity of systematic data, and the shifting definition of BIR 
categories over time, the salience of large industrial corporations to overall tax 
revenue is unmistakable. Manufacturing, transportation and public utilities, 
financial institutions, and trade were all leading sources of corporate-tax 
revenue from World War I to the onset of the Great Depression. Notably, while 
manufacturing firms were the leading source of corporate revenue throughout 
 
 109. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, 
COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1916, at 12 (1918); infra Table C. 
 110. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, 
COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1918 at 14, 19 (1921). 
 111. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME 
COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1916 (1918); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL 
REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1918 (1921); TREASURY 
DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM RETURNS OF NET INCOME 
FOR 1920 (1922); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM 
RETURNS OF NET INCOME FOR 1925 (1927); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, 
STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM RETURNS OF NET INCOME FOR 1930 (1932). 
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this period, the apparent rise of financial intermediation and the relative decline 
of mining are also apparent from the data.112 
As large-scale industrial corporations became increasingly significant 
sources of total tax revenue, the highly integrated aspects of these corporate 
enterprises also seemed to ease the administrative burden on tax authorities. In 
the process of creating and expanding integrated and highly efficient business 
organizations, corporate business managers were also providing government tax 
authorities with a single site for an enormous amount of income-tax 
information. Measuring and reaching the income of millions of small merchants 
or scattered artisans was much more administratively challenging than tapping a 
small number of large, integrated manufacturers. The economies of scale that 
were driving mass production and distribution were, in short, facilitating 
income-tax collections. 
With an increasing proportion of income and output moving through larger 
units of production and distribution, tax collection could become more 
centralized. Instead of trying to get handles on a large number of small and 
dispersed producers of goods, the BIR could focus its energies, as it did, on the 
concentrated regions of the country where many of the large-scale industrial 
corporations were situated.113 At the same time, the BIR itself seemed to 
become more business-like in its efficient collection of revenue, especially 
during the World War I period, when a dramatic increase in administrative 
capacity and improvements substantially decreased the costs of tax collection. 
According to BIR statistics, the average cost of collection declined steadily 
from a high of over two dollars for every hundred dollars collected in 1909 to 
roughly thirty cents by 1918.114 Though there were likely several reasons for this 
steep increase in collection efficiency, including the World War I Treasury 
Department’s efforts to access a traditional reservoir of patriotism and civic 
voluntarism,115 the scale economies of taxing large, integrated corporations with 
a newly reorganized and well-trained BIR were likely part of the reason. 
 
 112. See supra Table C. 
 113. SEC’TY OF THE TREASURY DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 
ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1910, at 452 (1911). There are, 
of course, limits to the notion that the concentration of businesses facilitates tax collection. In the 
extreme case, if there were just one large business, tax collection would suffer from the lack of 
information collected through business to business transactions. 
 114. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 21, at 555. 
 115. For a general assessment of civic voluntarism during World War I, see generally CHRISTOPHER 
CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU (2008); on the ways that the World War I Treasury tapped 
wartime patriotism and civic voluntarism for the payment of income taxes, see generally Ajay K. 
Mehrotra, Lawyers, Guns & Public Monies: The U.S. Treasury, World War One, and the Administration 
of the Modern Fiscal State, 28 L. & HIST. REV. 173 (2010). 
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B.   Managerial Corporate Capitalism and the Development of the Personal-
Income Tax 
It was not only as sources of corporate-income taxes and as concentrated 
collection sites that large industrial enterprises contributed to the elaboration of 
the income tax; they also influenced the development of personal-income taxes 
in similar ways. First, the great wealth created by these large economic 
organizations was distributed to two main groups that were the leading sources 
of personal-income-tax revenue: the highly paid top executives who were 
managing these new large-scale business enterprises and the corporate 
stockholders who were collecting handsome dividends and investment profits 
from their ownership of these firms. Second, the new business enterprises were 
also pivotal intermediaries in the process of collecting individual-income taxes. 
During the early phases of corporate taxation, when it seemed unclear whether 
corporate taxes were aimed at business corporations as separate entities or were 
simply proxies for an income tax on shareholders, large-scale business 
enterprises played a critical role in helping to collect income taxes.116 And when 
early and crude forms of personal-income-tax withholding were adopted, 
corporations remained vital remittance vehicles for individual income taxes. 
Although the process of tax withholding changed over time, this aspect of the 
rise of managerial corporate capitalism may have had the greatest long-term 
impact on the effective administration of the modern U.S. income tax. 
Like the corporate tax, the early personal-income tax began with relatively 
modest rates and high-exemption levels, but it too was radically altered by the 
World War I fiscal revolution. The 1913 income tax, for example, exempted 
incomes under $3000 ($4000 for married couples), and imposed a “normal” rate 
of 1% on all income up to $20,000, after which graduated “surtax” rates 
reaching a peak of 6% for income over $5 million were applied.117 According to 
modern estimates, only about 2% of American households were affected by the 
1913 income tax, and the average tax rate for top earners was only 6%.118 World 
War I, of course, forever altered the fiscal landscape. Beginning with the 
Revenue Act of 1916, Congress lowered exemption levels and dramatically 
increased rates.119 At the height of the World War I tax regime, the exemption 
level dropped to $1000 ($2000 for married couples), normal rates soared to 6% 
for the first $4,000 of income above exemption levels and 12% for all income 
beyond $4,000, and surtax rates skyrocketed to a top rate of 65%.120 Nearly one 
in five American households paid some income tax, and the effective rate on 
 
 116. On the multiple motivations behind the early corporate tax, see generally Avi-Yonah, supra 
note 6; Bank, supra note 6; Kornhauser, supra note 6. 
 117. Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913). 
 118. BROWNLEE, supra note 20, at 46; HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 5-114 to -115 
tbl.Ea758–72. 
 119. On the importance of the 1916 Act, see generally W. Elliot Brownlee, Wilson and Financing the 
Modern State: The Revenue Act of 1916, 129 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 173 (1985). 
 120. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 216, 40 Stat. 1057, 1069 (1918). 
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top income earners (those earning more than $1 million) reached a high of 
65%.121 
Over time, as managerial corporate capitalism spread and exemption levels 
declined, the sources of personal income reflected the growing importance of 
the elite business class. Modern historians have estimated that for the early 
income tax, this amorphous group of “[b]usinessmen . . . accounted for about 
eighty-five percent of the income reported, and almost ninety percent of the tax 
paid.”122 Contemporary estimates of the average annual salaries of business 
executives further suggest that top corporate managers fell well within the early 
web of income taxes. According to a 1925 study of pre–World War I salaries, 
average yearly executive salaries for the largest firms (those with capital over 
$1.5 million) was roughly $10,000, well beyond the $4,000 exemption level for 
married couples.123 The average annual salaries of top managers at smaller firms 
also frequently fell within the existing income-tax brackets.124 To be sure, the 
total number of top managers paying income taxes was not large enough to 
sustain the revenue needs of a modern nation-state.125 Still, a more careful 
examination of data from income-tax returns over time corroborates that 
salaries were becoming an increasingly larger source of individual income. 
Whereas salaries accounted for less than 20% of total personal-income-tax 
revenue in 1916, by the end of the war, salaries generated nearly 60% of 
individual-income-tax receipts.126 Although this figure declined during the post-
war fiscal retrenchment, salaries remained the leading source of personal-
income-tax revenue throughout the rest of the twentieth century.127 
 
 
 121. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 5-113 tbl.Ea748–757; U.S. TREASURY 
DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME, COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS 
FOR 1920, at 21 (1920); W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, 
in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? 29 (Joel Slemrod ed., 2000). 
 122. BUENKER, supra note 4, at 14. 
 123. F.W. Taussig & W.S. Baker, American Corporations and their Executives: A Statistical Inquiry, 
40 Q. J. ECON. 4, 19 (1925). 
 124. Id. The average wage earner, of course, made much less, earning about a total of $1,400 on an 
annual basis. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
347 (1930). 
 125. In fact, only about 226,000 American households with income over $10,000 actually filed 
income taxes in 1920, but this group accounted for more than 75% of total individual income-tax 
revenue in that year. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF 
INCOME, COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1920, at 4–5 (1920). 
 126. See infra Table D. 
 127. Indeed, in 1998, salaries and wages accounted for nearly 72% of total adjusted gross income. 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1998). 
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Table D 
Leading Sources of Early Personal-Income Tax, 1916–1930 
(nominal dollars in thousands and as percentage of total tax revenue)128 
 1916  1920  1925  1930  
Salaries $ 1,478,346  18%  $15,270,373  57%  $9,742,159  39%  $ 9,921,952  44% 
Business* $ 2,637,474  32%  $ 5,927,327  22%  $3,688,804  15%  $ 2,628,056  12% 
Dividends $ 2,136,468  26%  $ 2,735,845  10%  $3,464,624  14%  $ 4,197,303  19% 
 
Interest and 
Investments 
—  — 
  $1,814,402  7%  $ 1,940,437  9% 
Total Income $ 8,349,901    $26,690,269    $25,272,034    $22,412,445   
* Personal income from business refers to income from sole proprietorships. 
 
As industrial corporations began to tap capital markets more aggressively in 
the early twentieth century, dividends and gains from investments also became 
an important source of personal income. Because the definition of investment 
profits, or capital gains, varied during the early years of the income tax, there is 
little consistent data on this income-tax revenue stream. Nonetheless, the early 
decades of the twentieth century witnessed the increasingly widespread 
dispersion of corporate-stock ownership.129 It was also a time when industrial 
firms, like Bethlehem Steel and U.S. Steel, began using stock-bonus plans to 
reward top managers.130 As a speculation economy and an ideology of 
“shareholder democracy” took hold, more and more Americans began to 
identify themselves as stockholders.131 Indeed, the distribution of stock 
ownership among the middle class seemed to increase dramatically.132 
Accordingly, dividends made up a growing amount, if not a growing percentage, 
of total personal income in this period. In the aggregate, dividends, salaries, and 
 
 128. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME 
COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1916 (1918); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL 
REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME COMPILED FROM THE RETURNS FOR 1918 (1921); TREASURY 
DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM RETURNS OF NET INCOME 
FOR 1920 (1922); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM 
RETURNS OF NET INCOME FOR 1925 (1927); TREASURY DEPARTMENT, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE, 
STATISTICS OF INCOME FROM RETURNS OF NET INCOME FOR 1930 (1932). 
 129. H.T. Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the United States, 30 Q. J. ECON. 
15, 15–17 (1924). 
 130. Harwell Wells, “No Man Can be Worth $1,000,000 A Year”: The Fight Over Executive 
Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1462791. 
 131. MITCHELL, supra note 51, at 197–205; David Hochfelder, “Where the Common People Could 
Speculate”: The Ticker, Bucket Shops, and the Origins of Popular Participation in Financial Markets, 
1880–1920, 93 J. AM. HIST. 335, 336 (2006); Ott, supra note 51, at 44. Estimates suggest that although 
only about 3% of U.S. households owned stock before World War I, by the end of the 1920s that 
figured had jumped to nearly 25%. Ott, supra note 51, at 45. 
 132. By 1923, more than half of all dividends paid went to people with incomes below $20,000. 
MITCHELL, supra note 51, at 103 (citing to H.T. Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in 
the United States, 30 Q. J. ECON. 15 (1924)). 
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noncorporate business income accounted for a tremendous amount of personal-
income-tax revenue. As a group these three categories generated more than 
three-quarters of total individual-income-tax receipts in 1916, nearly 90% in 
1920, and roughly two-thirds of income-tax revenue throughout the 1920s.133 
One of the reasons why dividends and salaries became such a significant 
part of early personal-tax revenue was because of the key intermediary position 
of corporations in the tax-collection process. In the early years of the corporate 
tax, before the deliberate double taxation of corporate income, large business 
corporations served as vital collection devices for taxes that were arguably 
aimed at shareholders. Because the prevailing national tariffs and the 
dysfunctional subnational property tax did not reach the intangible wealth held 
by owners of business corporations, namely their investments in corporate 
securities, the pre–World War I corporate taxes could be seen as proxies for an 
income tax on shareholders, as some scholars have claimed.134 If that was the 
case, corporations were in a sense deputized as quasi-collection agents for the 
BIR. Even in subsequent decades, after the double taxation of corporate 
income became a conscious part of American tax policy, corporations would 
continue to be important remittance agents in the tax-collection process. 
Beginning with the 1913 income tax, a crude yet comprehensive form of 
withholding was used to ease the administrative burden on individual-income-
tax collections. Since large, integrated corporations were already using careful 
bookkeeping techniques to calculate precisely employment costs and dividend 
payouts, the federal government could easily exploit this information source 
and require corporations to withhold the tax payments on salaries and 
dividends. 
The U.S. experiment with withholding had begun, haltingly, with the Civil 
War income taxes. Borrowing the concept from the British, the Union used a 
“stoppage at the source” method of tax collection that was limited to 
government salaries, corporate dividends from railroads, and interest from 
financial institutions.135 Even at this early stage, lawmakers recognized that 
large-scale, integrated corporations could be effective remittance vehicles. As 
one tax commentator succinctly explained, “[I]t was much easier to collect from 
the corporations than from the individual stockholders and bondholders.”136 
And as corporations became bigger and more consolidated, this principle 
became even more evident. 
Whereas the Civil War income tax had made limited use of withholding, the 
1913 income tax imposed a more comprehensive method of what was referred 
to as “collection at the source.”137 The law provided that whenever a corporation 
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or individual paid out interest or dividends of any amount, or rent, premiums, 
wages, or salaries in excess of $3000, they were required not only to provide this 
information to the BIR, they also had to withhold the normal tax of 1% and pay 
it to the BIR on behalf of the payee.138 By 1913, dramatic changes in the size and 
structure of the American economy made the use of withholding via 
corporations and other intermediaries even more effective than during the Civil 
War. The arrival of urban–industrial capitalism not only increased the 
proportion of workers that were salaried employees, but the early convergence 
of large-scale manufacturing and finance capital also increased the amount of 
dividends and interest that were being paid out. 
Although, in theory, collection at the source could be highly efficient and 
even popular with taxpayers, the increasing complexity of tax laws led the 
Treasury Department to move from a system of “withholding at the source” to 
a method of collecting “information at the source.”139 The potential intricacies of 
the law became especially acute when the World War I tax regime imposed 
steeply progressive surtax rates. Lawmakers reasoned that a corporation could 
be a fairly reliable withholding agent when there was a flat normal rate that 
applied to all salaries and dividends, but that there was much greater 
uncertainty about the proper rate of taxation when there might be other sources 
of income besides salaries and dividends. Because of this reasoning and because 
collection at the source, which applied only to normal (as opposed to surtax) 
rates, was capturing only a small percentage of total tax revenue, Congress 
altered the withholding system during the war by replacing “collection at the 
source” with “information at the source” for nearly all taxpayers. Thereafter, 
corporations and other intermediaries provided detailed information about 
dividends, salaries, and other similarly situated fixed payments, but no longer 
collected the tax on these payments.140 
The advent of social security in the late 1930s reintroduced Americans to a 
type of withholding, though it was limited to earmarked payroll taxes.141 This 
experience with automatic payroll deductions would prove to be critical for 
policymakers and taxpayers alike, as the process of income-tax withholding 
developed over time.142 The more general procedure of withholding income 
taxes at the source did not return until the mid-1940s, when the turn to a mass 
tax compelled the government to reach out to a much greater swath of 
Americans.143 Although some libertarian scholars have bemoaned how the 
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advent of withholding has insidiously facilitated the growth of big government,144 
the development of withholding at the source may be one of the greatest 
legacies of the early income-tax laws. Modern lawmakers, for example, have 
celebrated withholding as “the cornerstone of the administration of our 
individual income tax.”145 And tax-law scholars and public-finance economists 
have come to agree that the process of third-party remittance is an essential 
feature of modern income-tax compliance.146 It is no mere coincidence that the 
earliest forms of withholding began during the early twentieth century, for it 
was then that lawmakers could more easily turn to the burgeoning industrial 
corporations for assistance in remitting personal-income-tax revenue. 
C.  Corporate Accounting and the Modern Income Tax 
In many ways, the development of tax withholding and information 
reporting would not have been possible without an even more fundamental 
change ushered in by the arrival of managerial corporate capitalism: the 
consolidation of innovate accounting methods. Modern business corporations, 
like modern tax collection, thrived on accurate information. To do their jobs, 
corporate executives needed and craved precise and systematic quantitative 
information about the everyday operations of their enterprises.147 In earlier 
periods, small-scale merchants could likely get by with ad hoc accounts of 
separate parts of their business transactions. During the rise of industrialism, 
however, high capital costs, the compelling demands of scientific management, 
and a new class of investors drove managers of modern industrial corporations 
to develop more-sophisticated forms of financial, capital, and cost accounting.148 
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As with so many other areas of management innovation, the mid-
nineteenth-century railroads led the way in centralizing and standardizing 
financial information and accounts.149 Other industrial concerns, such as steel 
companies, soon followed suit, and by the early twentieth century, leading 
manufacturers like Du Pont pioneered some of the most precise and 
consolidated types of accounting practices.150 Although business managers 
initially created new accounting methods to exploit the scale economies of mass 
production and distribution, these innovations facilitated—inadvertently 
perhaps—the development of the modern income tax by giving government 
organizations ample opportunities to assess and collect corporate profits and 
personal incomes. 
Among the many management innovations initiated by Du Pont, the 
consolidation of cost, capital, and financial accounting proved highly beneficial 
to tax collection. In combining these areas of recordkeeping, Du Pont focused 
carefully on overhead costs, which included indirect costs such as salaries, and 
direct material costs like tax liability. These figures, unsurprisingly, were a boon 
to tax collection. Similarly, the new focus on capital accounting—that is on the 
rate of return on invested capital—allowed Du Pont officials to evaluate and 
plan their use of fixed and working capital. Though this information was 
provided mainly for the use of the company’s executive committee, over time it 
would also became a useful resource for assessing tax liability.151 
There were, to be sure, precedents for the federal exploitation of corporate 
accounting. Throughout the nineteenth century, industrial enterprises—like 
railroads—were, for example, liable for state and local property taxes and, on 
occasion, even for state taxes on gross receipts.152 Thus, company auditors and 
financial experts needed to account for an enterprise’s regular state and local 
tax liabilities. Public utilities also came under the regulatory powers of 
subnational governments, and, as part of their rate-monitoring functions, street 
railways and sewer and gas companies were required to share financial 
information regularly with state and local regulators.153 Though many regulated 
and taxed businesses often exercised their political power to evade regulatory 
rules, and to avoid or delay their state and local tax payments, these companies 
could not claim that they did not have an accurate account of their regular 
financial performance. In fact, railroads employed small armies of accountants 
and auditors, probably more than the federal or any state government.154 Over 
time, government officials at all levels began using the financial information 
intended for managers, directors, and investors to facilitate the process of tax 
collection. 
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At the federal level, the advanced accounting for salaries and dividends was 
particularly useful for the development of the individual income tax. Modern 
business corporations employed hundreds of thousands of professional, salaried 
managers. Monitoring the payment of salaries to these employees was an 
important part of calculating the expenses of the growing industrial enterprises. 
The salary information not only helped companies keep track of labor costs, it 
also provided government tax authorities with a platform from which to tax 
these salaries as part of the early personal-income tax. Similarly, as the 
separation of ownership and control of large corporations became more 
pronounced, and as financial intermediaries began to play a more prominent 
role in underwriting business expansion, accurate measures of return on 
investment and dividend yields became increasingly significant. Here too, 
government tax authorities found new tax handles to tap dividends and capital 
gains as personal income from property. 
The rise of a fledgling accounting profession during this time period also 
supported the links between systematic recordkeeping and tax collection. The 
early income-tax laws, to be sure, increased the demand for accounting services, 
which required professional accountants to patrol the borders between trained 
experts and unqualified amateurs.155 Yet, the true significance of the accounting 
profession for tax collection in the early years of the income tax came from the 
profession’s identity that it was operating as independent, objective, and fair 
arbitrators between taxpayers and the government. Edwin L. Suffern, the 1912 
president of the American Association of Public Accountants, reminded his 
colleagues that professional accountants had a responsibility in providing the 
accurate financial information that could benefit all interested parties, including 
the state.156 Over time, as the tax burden on businesses and individuals 
increased, the growing demand for accountants and lawyers and the increasing 
competition to provide tax services eroded this ethos of objective 
independence. Consequently, tax accountants increasingly became advocates 
for their clients rather than neutral arbitrators. 
Corporate managers—and their auditors and lawyers—may not have 
intended their rational and routinized accounting methods to be used by tax 
authorities, but once the institutional foundations were firmly in place, a 
virtuous feedback cycle seemed to emerge whereby new tax laws would 
reinforce accurate business accounting. This type of symbiosis was apparent at 
the subnational level during the turn of the century, though in the other 
direction. Government research bureaus, like the New York Bureau of 
Municipal Research, were not only relying on corporate data, but also adopting 
“business methods” such as executive budgets and centralized accounting.157 By 
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the early decades of the twentieth century, the feedback mechanism was also 
working in the opposite direction, for the activist tax state was shaping the 
accounting practices of corporations. One way this was occurring was through 
the stiff reporting requirements that accompanied the early income-tax laws. 
The 1909 corporate tax, for instance, required all business corporations to file 
detailed returns listing not only gross income but all permissible deductions, 
including operating expenses, interest on debt, other taxes paid, and losses not 
covered by insurance. Returns were due on March 1st, and fines were imposed 
for late filing, for fraudulent returns, and for not filing at all. And, perhaps most 
important, returns were initially deemed to be public records and thus open to 
inspection.158 Although business interests complained vehemently about the 
reporting requirements, especially the potential for full disclosure,159 the 
hierarchically managed modern business corporation seemed to be well suited 
to take on the new tax reporting requirements. One of the great achievements 
of managerialism, after all, was its ability to calculate precisely the costs and 
profits from mass production and distribution. 
The U.S. Treasury Department was highly cognizant of how tax laws could 
foster greater systematic tax information. During the Great War, federal tax 
officials claimed that the income-tax laws, and especially the newly complex war 
and excess-profits taxes, were forcing businesses to reform their accounting 
practices. “Businessmen were deriving one inestimable benefit from the new tax 
law,” Daniel C. Roper, the wartime Commissioner of Internal Revenue, later 
recounted. “Complicated and technical as were the minutiae, they were learning 
how to keep accurate records of profit and loss.”160 Roper was surely 
exaggerating the power and influence of the World War I tax regime, but he 
accurately identified how the modern income tax was perpetuating its own 
existence by helping reinforce its institutional foundations. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
It has been roughly a century since the 1909 corporate tax and the Sixteenth 
Amendment together helped pave the way for the elaboration of the modern 
income tax. Yet, even before the corporate levy was enacted or the 
constitutional amendment was ratified, more-fundamental economic and 
material changes were already laying the critical groundwork for the 
subsequent development of direct and progressive taxes. Well before the first 
permanent national income tax was adopted in 1913, a unique array of 
technological innovations and resource-based circumstances were fueling 
American economic growth and helping propel the United States into a world 
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industrial power. The income tax benefited enormously from these economic 
transformations. As an increasing amount of economic output and income 
moved through the formal channels of a regulated national market, government 
authorities seized new opportunities to assess and collect income taxes. 
There was perhaps no greater facilitator of the expansion of markets and the 
adoption of income taxes than the modern, large-scale industrial corporation. 
These highly integrated business enterprises helped create the corporate and 
individual wealth that would soon become a central source of income-tax 
revenues. The big businesses themselves became significant sources of 
corporate income, just as salaried, professional managers and dividend-
receiving stockholders became important sources of personal-income-tax 
revenue. As these modern business enterprises became more integrated and 
concentrated, they also provided vital administrative assistance to the collection 
of income taxes. The concentration of capital and labor in these new 
organizational units provided government authorities with convenient “tax 
handles” to identify and gather both corporate and individual income taxes. 
Likewise, the systematic record-keeping and accounting that helped to foster 
the rise of managerial corporate capitalism also provided government agencies 
with crucial tax information. The U.S. Treasury exploited this access to 
information with its own innovations, including early, crude types of 
withholding, which lowered the costs of tax collection. New and more-complex 
tax laws, in turn, reinforced the rational bookkeeping that was at the heart of 
industrial capitalism and that helped facilitate income-tax compliance. 
The establishment of modern tax institutions that accompanied economic 
growth and the emergence of the modern business corporation did not occur 
easily or quickly; these institutions were part of a broader, contested process of 
change, frequently accelerated by national emergencies such as the two world 
wars. In some cases, the evolution was episodic. The institution of tax 
withholding, for example, had limited initial success, and was even replaced 
during the pivotal World War I era when business interests convinced U.S. 
Treasury officials that steeply progressive rates were incompatible with income-
tax collection at the source. Tax withholding returned, however, during the 
Second World War, and, by the end of the twentieth century, it became one of 
the most important aspects of effective tax compliance. In other cases, 
institutional achievements were more fleeting. Corporate taxes as a source of 
total tax revenue grew during the first half of the century, peaking in 1943, but 
since then they have diminished rapidly. In still other situations, the 
development of tax institutions has been more promising. Corporations as 
remittance devices—not only in withholding employee salaries but also for 
information about dividends and other sources of individual income—have 
remained critical to the effective functioning of a quasi-voluntary system of tax 
compliance. Although social crisis and political will have been vital to the 
development of these important tax institutions, many of them may not have 
been possible without the antecedent material conditions provided by 
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American economic growth and the advent of modern managerial corporate 
capitalism. 
